A New Direction in Modern Anglo-American Legal Theory
Abstract
The study examines the genesis of inclusive legal positivism, its key problematic issues, and its place within contemporary Anglo-American legal thought. The subject of the research is the discourse emerged in the second half of the 20th century in the scholarly community of the common law tradition. The discourse revolved around a critical reflection on H.L.A. Hart’s legal philosophy, specifically concerning the relationship between law and morality, within the common methodological framework of modern analytical jurisprudence, which ultimately led to the formation of this school of thought. The methodological foundation of the work is a complex of cognitive methods, including dialectical and historical methods, general logical techniques, as well as the methods of conceptual analysis and comparison. The research posits H.L.A. Hart’s primary opponents, namely R. Dworkin, L.L. Fuller, and J. Finnis, have identified a weakness in his theory regarding its ability to explain the role of legal argumentation in law, as well in applying constitutional legislation and judicial decision-making are often based on legal principles and moral reasoning. It is concluded in an attempt to address these problematic questions, the school of inclusive legal positivism became distinct within contemporary Anglo-American theory, a position first conceptually formulated by W. Waluchow, key representatives of this school also include M. Kramer, K. Himma, J. Coleman, and N. MacCormick. An analysis of leading inclusive positivists’ views allows for the definition of this school of thought, which, in addition to recognizing the formal properties of law, accepts the conceptual possibility of incorporating moral requirements as additional means of maintaining normativity of a legal system. An observation formulated in the course of the research is a distinctive feature of inclusive positivism is its reliance, for justifying its theses, predominantly on the practice of the common law tradition and its appeal to arguments that, in effect, blur the boundaries between different approaches to understanding law. Consequently, the author identifies a number of problematic aspects of this school, including: insufficient connection with legal reality, contextual limitations, and an idealization of social processes within the framework of liberal discourse.
References
Bertea S. (2007) A Critique of Inclusive Positivism. Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, vol. 93, no. 1, pp. 67–81.
Bix B.H. (2008) Legal Philosophy in America. In: The Oxford Handbook of American Philosophy. C. Misak (ed.). New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 551–577.
Coleman J. (2001) The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory. Oxford: University Press, 246 p.
Coleman J., Leiter B. (1996) Legal Positivism. In: Companion to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory. D. Patterson (ed.). Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 226–248.
Cross R. (1987) Statutory Interpretation. London: Butterworths, 224 p.
Cross R. (1991) Precedent in English Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 256 p.
Didikin A.B. (2021) In Search of the Moral Foundations of Law: Debates on the Nature of Inclusive Legal Positivism. Omskiy nauchnyy vestnik. Obshchestvo. Istoriya. Sovremennost’=Omsk Scholar Bulletin. Society. History. Modernity, no. 4, pp. 119–123 (in Russ.)
Dworkin R. (1986) Law’s Empire. Cambridge (Mass.): Belknap Press, 470 p.
Dworkin R. (2004) Taking Rights Seriously. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 392 p. (in Russ.)
Finnis J. (2012) Natural Law and Natural Rights. Moscow: IRISEN, 554 p. (in Russ.)
Fuller L.L. (2007) The Morality of Law. Moscow: IRISEN, 308 p. (in Russ.)
Hart H.L.A. (2007) The Concept of Law. Saint Petersburg: University, 304 p. (in Russ.)
Hart H.L.A. (2012) Postscript. In: The Concept of Law. P. Craig (ed.). Oxford: University Press, pp. 238–276.
Himma K. (2001) Law’s Claim of Authority. In: Hart’s Postscript. J. Coleman (ed.). Oxford: University Press, pp. 271–309.
Himma K. (2002) Inclusive Legal Positivism. In: The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law. J. Coleman (ed.). New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 125–165.
Himma K. (2005) Final Authority to Bind with Moral Mistakes: On the Explanatory Potential of Inclusive Legal Positivism. Law and Philosophy, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 1–45.
Himma K. (2014) The Logic of Showing Possibility Claims: A Positive Argument for Inclusive Legal Positivism and Moral Grounds of Law. Revus — Journal for Constitutional Theory and Philosophy of Law, vol. 23, pp. 77–104.
Koval S.V. (2019) The Category of Principles in R. Dworkin’s Philosophy of Law. Znanie. Ponimanie. Umenie=Knowledge. Understanding. Skill, no. 3, pp. 237–244 (in Russ.)
Koval S.V. (2021) The Debate over the Subject Matter of Anglo-American Legal Philosophy. Antinomii=Antinomies, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 30–54 (in Russ.)
Kramer M. (2000) How Moral Principles Can Enter into the Law. Legal Theory, no. 1, pp. 83–108.
MacCormick N. (1978) Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 298 p.
MacCormick N. (2005) Rhetoric and the Rule of Law: A Theory of Legal Reasoning. Oxford: University Press, 287 p.
MacCormick N. (2007) Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory. Oxford: University Press, 317 p.
MacCormick N. (2008) MacCormick On MacCormick. In: The Post-Sovereign Constellation, Law and politics in Neil MacCormick’s theory of law. J.E. Fossum, A.J. Menendez (eds.). Oslo: ARENA, pp. 11–19.
MacCormick N., Summers R. (1991) Interpreting Statutes: a Comparative Study. Aldershott: Dartmouth, 576 p.
Ogleznev V.V. (2021) Kenneth Himma’s Metaphysical Conceptualism as a Variety of Inclusive Legal Positivism. Omskiy nauchnyy vestnik. Obshchestvo. Istoriya. Sovremennost’=Omsk Scholar Bulletin. Society. History. Modernity, no. 4, pp. 110–118 (in Russ.)
Schauer F. (2010) Was Austin Right After All? Ratio Juris, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 1–21.
Stelmach J. (2021) The Cognitive Approach in Legal Science and Practice: A History of Four Revolutions. In: Law and Mind: A Survey of Law and the Cognitive Sciences. Law and the Cognitive Sciences. B. Brozek, J. Hage, N. Vincent (eds.). New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 507–520.
Tamanaha B.Z. (2007) The Contemporary Relevance of Legal Positivism. Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy, vol. 32, pp. 1–38.
Tumanov V.A. (1971) Bourgeois Legal Ideology: a Critique of Legal Theories. Moscow: Nauka, 381 p. (in Russ.)
Waluchow W. (1994) Inclusive Legal Positivism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 300 p.
Waluchow W. (2000) Authority and The Practical Difference Thesis: A Defense of Inclusive Legal Positivism. Legal Theory, vol. 6, pp. 45–81.
Waluchow W. (2005) Constitutions as Living Trees: An Idiot Defends. Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 207–247.
Waluchow W. (2008) Four Concepts of Validity: Further Reflections on the Inclusive/Exclusive Positivism Debate. Legal Philosophy between State and Transnationalism. Seminar Series, vol. 39, pp. 1–34.
Copyright (c) 2026 Gorbunov M.D.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.













