Rationality in Law

Abstract

This article analyzes the event of the International legal philosophy symposium “Rationality in law”.The author’s attention is focused on the description of the main points of the presentations made atthe symposium. As to M. Antonov’s presentation, the author stresses the importance of analysis ofthe arguments in favor of unity of law that have been postulated in the history of legal philosophy andwhich have been often based on different versions of holism. L. Clerico stressed that the conceptionof weighing principles elaborated by the contemporary German philosopher Robert Alexy is applicablein constitutional law. The presentation of P. Chiassoni specified three kinds of truth: formal truth ascorrespondence of reasoning to laws of logic; instrumental truth as applicability of means for obtainingof certain goals; essential truth as selection of highest ethical values and relations between them. Thereport of R. Caracciolo was devoted to the problem of correlation between the binding force of norms andthe persuasive force of reasons for action. J. Moreso analyzed the applicability of classical logic in theworld of law and how laws of logic work in legal order. M. Farrell proposed an interesting reconstructionof the legal philosophy of Jeremy Bentham in the light of his project of codification and restructuring thejudicial system of England. J. Rodriguez in his presentation compared the differences between the logicof norms and the logic of normative propositions. E. Bulygin concentrated his attention on comparativeanalysis of analytical philosophy of law and of metaphysical conceptions of rationality in law. In hispresentation C. Carcova defended the postulates of the school of critical legal studies. R. Vigo stressedthe importance of natural law and legal argumentation in philosophy of law. In his presentation, J. Cerdioattempted to differentiate law from morality through the lenses of Kantian division between theoreticalreason and practical reason. R. Gibourg described and compared the relative force of magical andrational principles in law. In the presentation of E. Lisanuyk three images of deontic logic in law were