Legal Basis for Imposing Additional Customs Duties by the President of the United States
Abstract
The canonized predictability of the multilateral trading system, ensured, among other things, by the agreements of the World Trade Organization, was nullified 30 years after its establishment, although the process of destruction began somewhat earlier. This became possible because of unilateral actions by one member state of this international organization. This study attempts to identify the specifics of the American legislation in additional customs duties imposed by the US President. Sources of law at both the national and international levels are examined, as well as current practice and the results of cases considered by arbitration panels to establish the compliance of relevant decisions with WTO obligations. The study was conducted with using general methods of study — systematization and logical analysis helped to determine specifics of US national legislation in the field of presidential powers to impose additional tariffs. This work also used special scientific methods of cognition, such as the formal dogmatic method, the method of generalization and hermeneutics, and the historical legal method. The analysis revealed the specific features of substantive and procedural regulations used by the US President when making decisions on the imposition of additional tariffs. The relevant provisions of national legislation were examined, as well as the specifics of the wording used in international bilateral and universal multilateral trade agreements and agreements with a limited number of participants. Particular attention is paid to the controversial issue of the admissibility of applying the provisions of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which was first used by the US President in 2025 as a legal basis for an unprecedented increase in customs duties. Based on an analysis of the current practice of considering cases by arbitration panels of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, the most compelling legal grounds that were successfully used by the parties as arguments in their defense against unilateral US actions to increase tariffs have been identified. The influence of contemporary geopolitical challenges on the transformation of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is demonstrated.
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