Could Robot be a Legal Subject? (In Search of Legal Forms for Digital Economy Regulation)
Abstract
In the digital age the development of robotics using artificial intelligence has reached a new scale and raises both socio-economic and legal problems. Of particular relevance in this context is the problem of the legal personality of robots, which are able to perform independent actions and to adapt to the environment. The resolution of the European Parliament on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (2017) shows that the problem has not only scientific, but also practical or applied significance. In legal science, the interpretation of the concept of a person differs depending on legal understanding. According to a “narrowly realistic” understanding of the law a robot cannot be recognized as a legal subject. On the contrary, according to the approach to the legal world as a special and self-sufficient reality, the question of the legal personality of the robot is pragmatic. The article analyzes the history of the formation of the legal concept of a person and its role in the legal concept of the world. For Roman jurists, the concept of a person (persona) meant, in the first place, a “mask”, i.e. this or that social function of a person. For them the meaning of the legal concept of a person was never identical to the meaning of the concept of the human personality. On the contrary, for European law, which was strongly influenced by philosophical ideas, the problem of confusing the concepts of the person and the human personality is quite characteristic. The authors of the article come to the conclusion that uncritical perception of non-legal ideas and theories can become an obstacle to the development of law. The law can play an active role in the development of the economy and society as a whole only by preserving its identity. Thus, the question of the legal personality of robots should be decided on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of the possible (economic and social) costs and benefits. Recognition of a robot as a legal entity is connected, first of all, with the need for more efficient allocation of responsibility. At the same time, the distribution of responsibilities is aimed at solving not only the economic, but also the legal problem, that of balancing the interests and adapting the law to social reality. The flexibility and elasticity of civil-law concepts leads to the conclusion that the choice of a specific model of legal personality and distribution of responsibilities will depend on current needs and practices.
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